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Executive Summary
Refund to Savings 2015–2016:  
Field Experiments to Promote Tax-Time Saving in 
Low- and Moderate-Income Households
Stephen P. Roll, Genevieve Davison, Michal Grinstein-Weiss,  
Mathieu R. Despard, and Sam Bufe
The Refund to Savings (R2S) Initiative is a collaborative effort of Washington University in St. Louis, Duke University, and Intuit, the 
makers of TurboTax. With the tools of behavioral 
economics, the initiative has constructed and tests 
low-touch, scalable interventions designed to 
encourage tax-time saving in an online tax preparation 
environment. Specifically, R2S encourages low- and 
moderate-income (LMI) tax filers to deposit some of 
their federal tax refund into a savings account. 
The R2S Initiative embeds interventions within 
TurboTax Freedom Edition (TTFE), an online tax-
preparation platform available for free to LMI filers. 
We randomly assign participants to intervention or 
control groups and thus are able to precisely identify 
the impacts of our interventions. Now in its sixth year 
(from 2012 into 2018), the initiative has led tens of 
thousands of additional households to deposit their 
tax refunds into savings. Past R2S experiments have 
shown that it is possible to increase rates of tax-time 
savings deposits among LMI filers through the use of 
framing and messaging strategies as well as anchoring 
and choice architecture (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2015).
In 2013, the first full-scale R2S experiment explored 
the effects of motivational messaging prompts and 
suggested savings amounts (or, savings anchors) on the 
tax-time savings behavior of 680,545 TTFE users. We 
found that anchors are effective at increasing both 
the rate of refund savings deposits and the average 
amount of refund deposited to savings. We also found 
that messaging has positive but more modest effects 
(Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2015). In 2015 and 2016, the 
years covered in this report, we continued to examine 
different approaches to motivational messaging while 
also exploring the roles that choice architecture plays 
in driving tax-time savings behavior. We tested these 
behavioral mechanisms on 646,116 participants in 
2015 and on 284,125 in 2016. In the 2015 iteration of 
R2S, we also used an online, longitudinal survey to 
assess the effects of the interventions 6 months after 
tax filing. We administered the survey to a subset of 
participants at two points: Immediately after they filed 
their taxes and again 6 months later.
The 2015 and 2016 R2S experiments build on prior 
years by testing the effects of choice architecture and 
different messaging strategies on tax refund savings 
behavior. We found that, in 2015, a choice architecture 
making the option to deposit to savings more salient 
for tax filers, in combination with savings-focused 
messages, drove substantial increases in rates of 
depositing the tax refund to savings vehicles. In 
2016, we attempted to separate the effects of choice 
architecture from the effects of messaging and found 
that choice architecture by itself increased tax-time 
savings deposits. The additional effects of messaging 
were minimal, but we found that messaging on 
emergency savings appeared to be more effective than 
messaging on the two other topics. The 2015 and 2016 
interventions also found that refund-splitting rates—
the rates at which filers split the refund by depositing 
it in more than one account—are quite low (less than 
1% for all groups). 
This report also details the effects of the 2015 R2S 
experiment 6 months after the point of tax filing. 
We found that treatment participants were generally 
no more likely than control-group participants to 
have any of the refund saved after 6 months, but a 
surprising finding emerged when we examined only 
the refund savings of nonstudents with persistent 
financial constraints: The percentage with any of 
vi // JUNE 2018
the refund saved after 6 months was higher among 
those exposed to any R2S intervention than among 
counterparts in the control group. And this effect 
was more pronounced among those who indicated 
at tax time that they could not access $2,000 in 
an emergency. This suggests that the effects of the 
R2S interventions persist over 6 months and may 
disproportionately benefit the participants most in 
need of emergency savings.
Key Findings
 Across the 2015 and 2016 intervention years, R2S generated 29,536 
additional savers and an additional $48 million deposited to 
savings vehicles.
 Simply changing the way refund deposit options were presented—
also referred to as choice architecture—increased rates of tax refund 
savings deposits by 43%.
 The savings impacts of the R2S interventions persisted across 6 
months among nonstudents with persistent financial constraints.
 Messaging around saving for emergencies appeared to be the most 
effective messaging prompt and was particularly effective among 
nonstudents who had persistent financial constraints and no 
emergency savings at tax time.
 The overall savings deposit rates of TTFE filers have increased in each 
year of the R2S Initiative. This possibly indicates that once tax filers 
are nudged to deposit into savings accounts, these behaviors persist 
through subsequent years of tax filing.
Part 1
Background: Refund to Savings
The Refund to Savings (R2S) Initiative is an ongoing collaboration between academia and industry partners, including researchers from 
Washington University in St. Louis, Duke University, 
and Intuit, Inc., the makers of TurboTax. The purpose 
of the initiative is to leverage insights from the field 
of behavioral economics to develop low-cost, low-
touch, scalable interventions to promote tax refund 
savings among LMI households. This research has 
been ongoing since 2012 and continues through the 
present day. 
This report covers the design and impacts of the R2S 
experiments in the 2015 and 2016 tax seasons (which 
include the 2014 and 2015 tax years), and also includes 
results from a 6-month follow-up survey conducted 
in 2015 to assess how the impacts of R2S interventions 
persist over time. These interventions reached a large 
number of tax filers in both of these years; 646,116 in 
2015 and 284,125 in 2016. 
The 2015 and 2016 R2S interventions primarily 
explored the impact of two behavioral mechanisms 
(detailed below) on tax refund savings behaviors:
1. Choice architecture, or how the options in a given 
decision are structured and presented to the 
decision maker. Specifically, we investigated how 
providing a choice architecture that emphasized 
saving the entire tax refund impacted savings 
deposit behaviors.
2. Persuasive messaging, or how providing different 
types of messages or framing around decisions 
can motivate people to act. In 2015 and 2016, we 
explored how a variety of savings messages—
including messages around emergencies, 
retirement, and general financial goals—impacted 
savings deposit behaviors.
By comparing interventions that incorporate choice 
architecture and persuasive messaging to promote 
savings with a control group that received no 
savings intervention, we are able to assess the causal 
impact of these interventions on tax-refund savings 
behaviors. We also compare savings behaviors across 
intervention conditions to better understand the 
relationships between different persuasive-messaging 
approaches and tax-refund savings behaviors.
Research Questions
 Do the R2S interventions impact refund-savings 
deposit behaviors at tax time?
 What are the contributions of choice architecture 
and persuasive messaging in driving savings 
deposits at tax time?
 What types of savings messages are the  
most effective at driving savings deposits?
 What is the overall impact of the R2S 
interventions 6 months after tax filing?
 Are the R2S interventions more effective for 
households with persistent financial constraints 
than for other sampled households?
 How does access to emergency savings moderate 
the 6-month impact of R2S interventions?
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In the rest of this report, we first present the 
background and motivation for this research, and 
outline the prior research done on the R2S Initiative. 
Then we provide a detailed overview of the 2015 
and 2016 experiments, the methods of analysis, and 
the impacts on tax-time savings deposits. Following 
the tax time analysis, we present the motivation 
for, methods of, and results from an analysis of the 
6-month impacts of the R2S interventions. Finally, 
we present conclusions and detail several policy 
implications from this work.
The Importance of Saving in  
LMI Households
Public policies aimed at improving the financial well-
being of low- and moderate-income (LMI) households 
typically pursue that goal through income-maintenance 
programs like Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families, consumption-support programs like the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, and work 
incentives like the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). 
Although these programs are valuable, income is only 
one component of financial well-being. Income- and 
consumption-maintenance programs can, for example, 
put food on the table or help parents to purchase 
necessities for their children, but they are generally 
inadequate at protecting households from financial 
emergencies or at facilitating long-term investments, 
including higher education, a down payment on a 
house, and the accumulation of retirement assets. 
Since the mid-1980s, researchers, policymakers, 
and practitioners have increasingly recognized that 
building assets, or wealth, is an important component 
of helping LMI households emerge from poverty. 
In Assets and the Poor (1991), Michael Sherraden laid 
the foundation for much of the asset building field 
and highlighted the ways asset building can improve 
social welfare. Assets enable long-term investments 
and afford protection when emergencies arise. 
But Sherraden also identified other mechanisms 
by which assets can improve the well-being of 
households. They enable households to focus on 
long-term financial goals and plan for the future. 
Assets foster positive expectations for one’s future 
and for the future of one’s children. They can make 
it possible to develop other assets (e.g., income or 
other assets accumulated as a result of investments 
in education or homeownership). And assets can 
influence personal efficacy—the belief in one’s 
ability to succeed. Subsequent research has identified 
additional potential benefits for financially constrained 
populations: The accumulation of assets is associated 
with the reduction of stress and anxiety (e.g., Carter, 
Blakely, Collings, Gunasekara, & Richardson, 2009; 
Roll, Taylor, & Grinstein-Weiss, 2016) as well as with 
the improvement of decision making processes, 
improvement that stems from the reduction of 
financial constraints (Mullainathan & Shafir, 2013).
Despite the importance of savings to long-term 
financial security and overall well-being, research on 
the financial lives of American households has shown 
that many possess little or no savings. A study from 
Pew Charitable Trusts (2015a) found that 41% of all 
U.S. households could not cover a $2,000 emergency 
expense and that 78% of low-income households could 
not cover one. A separate survey found that 26% of 
Americans had no emergency savings at all (Ross, 
2014). A lack of basic emergency savings can leave 
households vulnerable to financial shocks such as job 
loss, unexpected medical expenses, or unexpected 
vehicle repair. And financial shocks are common: Pew 
The R2S Initiative … makes an effort to complement oth-
er asset-building programs by creating a set of low-touch, 
scalable, flexible interventions to encourage house-
holds to save their own money at a key moment: when 
they are set to receive their tax refund.
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found that 60% of American households experienced 
one within the past year (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2015b). 
Households that cannot afford the cost of emergency 
expenses are at greater risk of incurring debt, 
including high-interest debt from such sources as 
payday loans, and are vulnerable to material hardship 
(Barr, 2012; Chase, Gjertson, & Collins, 2011; Couch, 
Daly, & Gardiner, 2011; Heflin, London, & Scott, 2011; 
Rawlings & Gentsch, 2008).
In addition to a lack of emergency savings, numerous 
other disparities distinguish LMI households from 
households with higher income: educational outcomes 
and attainment, homeownership rates, and retirement 
savings are particularly relevant in the current context. 
Engle and Tinto (2008) found that only 34% of low-
income, first-generation college students earned their 
bachelor’s degree within 6 years, but the rate was 66% 
among peers with higher incomes who were not first-
generation college students. Another study found that, 
as of 2014, households in the top quintile of income 
were 2.2 times more likely to be homeowners than 
were those in the bottom quintile (Prosperity Now, 
n.d.-b). And in 2015, more than half of households 
earning less than $40,000 per year had no savings 
for retirement; in comparison, about 30% of all U.S. 
households lacked retirement savings (Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2016).
Over the last 25 years, many efforts have been made to 
address these disparities. Prominent among them are 
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) and Child 
Development Accounts (CDAs): IDAs tend to focus on 
low-income households and do not exclusively target 
children whereas CDAs were designed to be available 
to all children regardless of socioeconomic status. 
The money deposited into IDAs is fully or partially 
matched, and use of the accrued savings is restricted 
to investments for specified purposes (e.g., to finance 
housing, education, or the launch of a small business). 
Many IDA programs also require account holders to 
participate in financial education.
In contrast, CDAs are typically savings or investment 
accounts seeded with an initial deposit and grown 
through parental contributions that may be matched. 
For example, the Harold Alfond College Challenge 
provides $500 at birth to every child born as a resident 
of Maine (Prosperity Now, n.d.-a). Moreover, CDAs 
feature other components intended to improve the 
financial well-being of participants. Many provide some 
form of financial education and specify rules on how 
the CDA funds can be used (e.g., for higher education). 
Evaluations of both IDA and CDA programs have 
found promising results. An experimental evaluation 
of an IDA program in Oklahoma found that IDAs 
increased the homeownership rates among renters by 
7 percentage points (Mills et al., 2008). A more recent 
evaluation found that an IDA program in New Mexico 
and California increased median liquid assets held by 
participants and decreased their rates of hardship and 
alternative financial service use (e.g., check cashing; 
Mills et al., 2016). Research from CDA evaluations has 
been similarly positive. Incentives that the Canada 
Education Savings Program offered to encourage 
saving for children’s postsecondary education have 
led to a steady increase in the amount of money 
that Canadian households save and to an increase 
in the amount of money they spend on education 
(Employment and Social Development Canada, 2015). 
In the United States, Maine’s NextGen plan offers 
matching grants to residents who open 529 college 
savings accounts, and an evaluation found that annual 
matching grants appear to be associated with higher 
annual savings (Clancy, Han, Mason, & Sherraden, 
2006). The SEED for Oklahoma Kids experiment, 
a large-scale study of CDAs for randomly selected 
newborns in Oklahoma, found that the program 
increased the rate at which the treatment group 
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Figure 1. Average federal refund, housing payment, and monthly gross income. The figure shows averages for all participants 
in the 2016 Household Financial Survey and for those receiving the federal Earned Income Tax Credit. Monthly housing payment is shown 
for filers whose payment does not equal zero.
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opened accounts and deposited in them as well as 
the amount of savings (Zager, Kim, Nam, Clancy, & 
Sherraden, 2010). Other research has found that the 
program also impacted parents’ expectations for their 
children and led to improvements in a number of 
psychosocial outcomes (Huang, Sherraden, Kim, and 
Clancy, 2014; Kim, Sherraden, Huang, & Clancy, 2015; 
Wikoff, Huang, Kim, & Sherraden, 2015).
Although IDA and CDA programs have been successful 
in improving participant outcomes and should 
be scaled up to reach more households, they are 
ultimately high-touch efforts requiring consistent 
funding, infrastructure development (i.e., account 
maintenance, transmission of matching funds, rule 
enforcement), and political buy-in at large scales (i.e., 
at city, state, and national levels). The R2S Initiative—
which is also guided by the perspective that assets and 
income are key components of financial security and 
well-being—makes an effort to complement other 
asset-building programs by creating a set of low-
touch, scalable, flexible interventions to encourage 
households to save their own money at a key moment: 
when they are set to receive their tax refund.
Building Savings at Tax Time
Tax time has been identified as a “savable moment” for 
LMI households (Tufano, Schneider, & Beverly, 2005, 
1). This is, in part, due to the fact that the tax refund is 
the largest lump sum payment many LMI households 
Table 1. Tools of Behavioral Economics Employed by the R2S Initiative from 2012 to 2016
Behavioral Mechanism Details of Mechanism Intervention  Year
Decision framing 
and messaging
Individuals are susceptible to sudden shifts in perception, and these shifts can be based upon 
the way that information is presented. This form of cognitive bias is called a framing effect. The 
R2S Initiative has used several framing approaches over the years. Examples include reminding 
participants about the possibility of emergency expenses as well as asking them to think about 
their goals for the future and for retirement.
2012–2016
Anchoring
People have a tendency to stay on or near a suggested reference point. Anchoring is commonly 
experienced in negotiations involving “low-balling” or “high-balling” tactics. For example, a 
car dealer may set a high sticker price with the hope of increasing the final sale price. In 2012 
and 2013, the R2S interventions suggested to participants that they should save a specific 
percentage of their refund (e.g., 50%) or a specific amount (e.g., $250). The suggestion was 
designed to anchor the participant’s choice to a specific savings target.
2012–2014
Choice architecture
At the crucial moment when individuals weigh choices, the environment and its features can 
impact decisions. The R2S Initiative has altered the choice architecture of the deposit screen 
where TTFE users select how they want to receive their refund. Specifically, the option to deposit 
to savings was placed first in the list, and the option to save the entire refund was placed above 
the option to save a part of the refund.
2012–2016
Note. R2S = Refund to Savings Initiative; TTFE = TurboTax Freedom Edition.
will receive all year. Our research with R2S participants 
can put tax time’s importance into perspective: In 2016, 
the $1,602 average federal refund received by our LMI 
study participants was equal to 2.1 times their average 
monthly housing payment and 1.3 times their average 
monthly gross income. For EITC recipients in our 
study, whose refunds averaged $2,908 in 2016, these 
figures increased to 3.8 and 2.2, respectively (Figure 1). 
Many LMI households experience dramatic income 
constraints, and tax time may be the only point in the 
year when they can afford to save—that is, the only time 
when their income exceeds their expenses by enough 
to realistically allow them to set aside some money 
for emergencies or other financial goals (Barr, 2012; 
Grinstein-Weiss, Russell, Gale, Key, & Ariely, 2017).
Other factors make tax time opportune for 
promoting saving. Tax filing is a nearly universal 
experience in the United States. In the 2016 tax-
filing season, the Internal Revenue Service processed 
152,250,000 tax returns and issued 111,069,000 
refunds. The average refund was $2,860. What’s 
more, over a third of tax filers prepared their own tax 
return (Internal Revenue Service, 2016). Thus, online 
tax-preparation environments are attractive venues 
for promoting tax time saving. Tax time also presents 
an attractive opportunity for behavioral intervention 
because taxpayers who have filed their taxes know 
how much money they will receive through their 
refund but still have time to decide where to deposit 
it. The R2S Initiative seeks to intervene in that 
moment of decision.
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Using Behavioral Economics to 
Promote Savings at Tax Time
As a means of encouraging filers to save their tax 
refund, the R2S Initiative uses the tools of behavioral 
economics to design savings interventions embedded 
within the TurboTax Freedom Edition (TTFE) 
tax-preparation platform. Research in behavioral 
economics has found that much of our decision 
making is not wholly rational; it is influenced by 
psychological, social, and emotional processes (Ariely, 
2010, 2011; Becker, 1976; Caplan, 2000; De Bondt & 
Thaler, 1994; Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; List, 2004). However, our behavior is irrational in 
systematic and predictable ways. By using behavioral 
principles to structure the environment in which 
individuals make tax filing decisions, we can encourage 
them to save the tax refund. Over the years, R2S has 
explored the use of a number of behavioral tools: 
framing to influence decisions through persuasive 
messaging, anchoring, and using choice architecture 
(see Table 1 for an overview of interventions across the 
years). This section provides background information 
on the tools.
Decision Framing and Messaging
Presenting information in a certain way, or framing it, 
has been shown to influence behavior (Epley, Mak, & 
Idson, 2006). For example, people have a tendency to 
discount the future when making decisions (Benhabib, 
Bisin, & Schotter, 2010), and this may explain why 
many do not save enough money for retirement 
(Diamond & Köszegi, 2003). People also tend to 
assume that their life circumstances will improve in the 
future (Bryan & Hershfield, 2012), an assumption that 
may cause them to underestimate the likelihood of 
financial shocks such as car repairs, medical expenses, 
and job loss.
Anchoring
Anchoring refers to the use of informational markers 
or points of reference to influence decisions 
involving the selection of a value (Munro & Sugden, 
2003; Sen, 1993; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). When 
anchors are provided, people have a tendency to 
stay on or near the anchor (Simmons, LeBoeuf, & 
Nelsom, 2010). For example, minimum payment 
thresholds for credit cards can function as anchors 
that bias households toward making payments closer 
to these minimums (Hershfield & Roese, 2015). Other 
research has found that higher retirement savings 
cues provided in emails are associated with increases 
in retirement savings contributions (Choi, Haisley, 
Kurkoski, & Massey, 2017).
Choice Architecture
Choice architecture involves the organization of decision 
environments to influence choice, often in ways that 
do not restrict the actual choices available (Thaler 
& Sunstein, 2008). A list of options is an example 
of choice architecture; the architecture, or order of 
choices, can be configured to suggest the optimal 
choice—such as by placing an option first to maximize 
its salience. A now classic example comes from the 
presentation of choices in a cafeteria checkout line: 
Placing healthy items first in the line and unhealthy 
choices last increases the likelihood that consumers 
will purchase the healthy options and reduces the 
likelihood that they will purchase the unhealthy 
ones (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Other examples of 
choice architecture interventions include presenting 
information about a choice or purchase in a clear and 
salient way (e.g., nutritional labeling) and providing 
instantaneous feedback on an action (e.g., cars that use 
noisy alerts if a rider is not wearing a seat belt). Choice 
architecture has been effectively applied in a number 
of contexts, including Medicare drug plans (Congdon, 
Kling, & Mullainathan, 2011) and retirement savings 
(Thaler & Benartzi, 2004).
Prior R2S Research  
on Tax Time Savings
Piloted in 2012, the R2S Initiative examined the effects 
of anchoring and messaging on tax-time savings 
behavior among LMI tax filers (Grinstein-Weiss et 
al., 2017). Specifically, the pilot experiment randomly 
assigned 107,632 TTFE users to a control condition 
or one of eight intervention groups. Each of the eight 
interventions exposed group members to a suggestion 
that they save a percentage of the refund (either 25% 
or 75%). The suggestion was intended to anchor the 
filers to the suggested amount. Two groups received 
no additional messaging prompt, and six groups saw 
one of three messaging prompts: one on emergency 
savings, one on financial goals, or one on retirement. 
The 2012 pilot found that the likelihood of placing a 
portion of the refund into a savings vehicle and the 
amount deposited into a savings vehicle (i.e., a savings 
account or U.S. savings bond) was greater among 
participants in any intervention group than among 
counterparts in the control group. The pilot also found 
that the amount of refund deposited to savings was 
associated with the anchor shown: Those shown the 
75% anchor deposited more than those shown the 25% 
anchor. However, the effects of the different messaging 
prompts were quite weak, showing little to no impact 
on savings deposits.
The 2013 R2S experiment expanded on the 2012 
pilot’s design by testing four messaging conditions 
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and five different savings anchors on 680,545 TTFE 
filers (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2015). The messaging 
conditions included a generic prompt encouraging 
saving but not mentioning any specific motive to save, 
an emergency prompt highlighting having enough 
savings to weather an emergency, a family prompt 
encouraging filers to think about the current or future 
needs of their family, and a future prompt giving filers 
general encouragement to save for the future. The 
savings anchors shown to tax filers included suggested 
savings amounts of 25% of the refund, 50% of the 
refund, 75% of the refund, $100, and $250. 
Analyses of the 2013 R2S experiment showed that the 
anchors increased rates of tax time savings deposits by 
0.8 to 1.2 percentage points and that higher anchors 
were associated with greater rates of savings deposits. In 
addition to demonstrating that the rates of saving were 
higher among filers shown the emergency and future 
prompts than among counterparts shown the generic 
prompt, the 2013 interventions increased the total 
amount deposited to savings and the rate of splitting 
the refund between a savings account and some other 
account.2 The overall rate of refund splitting among all 
treatment groups was fairly low (1.55%). 
The 2013 research also examined the impacts of the 
R2S interventions 6 months after households filed 
their taxes. We found that participants in intervention 
groups with higher anchors were more likely than 
control-group members to report having some of the 
refund saved after 6 months (e.g., 30% of participants 
in the 75% anchor group and 26% of the control group 
still had some refund saved), and participants in 
those intervention groups saved a higher proportion 
of their refund (e.g., 19% of the 75% anchor group vs. 
15% of the control group). Both at HFS1 and at HFS2,3  
the percentage of filers reporting that they could 
come up with $2,000 in an emergency was higher 
among those in the 75% anchor group than among 
counterparts in the control group (Grinstein-Weiss 
et al., 2015). Taken together, these results suggest that 
the impact of the R2S interventions extends at least 6 
months beyond tax time.
Because access to a savings vehicle is an essential 
part of the decision to save one’s refund, the 2013 
R2S interventions tested whether it was possible to 
induce filers who lacked a savings account to open 
one. The analyses indicated that the share of filers 
who lacked a savings account at tax time but had one 
6 months later was greater among those assigned 
to an R2S intervention than among counterparts in 
the control group (Despard, Grinstein-Weiss, Guo, 
& De Ruyter, 2018). Finally, analyses with the 2013 
data compared R2S participants who deposited any 
of their refund into savings with counterparts who 
deposited nothing, examining reported experiences 
of various hardships in the 6 months following 
tax filing. Filers who deposited any of the refund 
into savings were found to be less likely to report 
that they experienced food insecurity or material 
hardship (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2016).
In 2016, the $1,602 average federal refund received by our 
LMI study participants was equal to 2.1 times their average 
monthly housing payment and 1.3 times their average 
monthly gross income. For recipients of the EITC, these 
figures increased to 3.8 and 2.2, respectively.
Part 2
The Tax-Time Savings Experiments
The 2015 and 2016 R2S Interventions
The yearly, iterative nature of the R2S Initiative allows 
the research team to build on prior interventions in 
each subsequent year. The next two sections describe 
the 2015 and 2016 interventions as well as efforts to 
build upon prior experiences. In our analysis of data 
from both of these intervention years, we have sought 
to answer the following primary research questions:
 Do the R2S interventions impact refund savings 
deposit behaviors at tax time?
 What are the contributions of choice architecture 
and persuasive messaging in driving savings 
deposits at tax time?
 What types of savings messages are the most 
effective at driving savings deposits?
In supplemental analyses, we also examined the 
overall incremental impact of these interventions on 
aggregate savings deposits and the total amount of the 
refund deposited into savings accounts. We further 
trace the results of the R2S interventions over time 
and explore the implications of these results for the 
long-term impacts of tax-time savings interventions.
The 2015 R2S Interventions 
In 2013, the R2S interventions were largely oriented 
around using anchoring techniques to encourage 
filers to deposit a suggested amount of their refund 
into savings vehicles and to deposit the remainder 
into some other account. Although the interventions 
were effective at increasing the number of people 
who made savings deposits at tax time, only 1.55% of 
participants split the refund. This suggested that people 
prefer to deposit the refund into a single account. 
The 2015 interventions therefore shifted the focus 
away from splitting, instead encouraging participants 
to deposit the entire refund into savings vehicles. 
The 2015 interventions also incorporated interactive 
messaging prompts in which filers could indicate their 
savings goals on the refund-deposit screen. These were 
designed to further motivate filers to save.
Participants were randomly assigned to a control 
group or one of three intervention groups. The 
interventions combined an intentionally configured 
choice architecture with different messaging strategies 
designed to encourage saving. In contrast, the control 
group was exposed to the three deposit options shown 
in Figure 2: Filers could transfer the refund into a bank 
account by direct deposit, receive the refund via a paper 
check, or split the refund across multiple accounts.4  
Although filers could deposit their refund into a savings 
account after they selected the bank account option, the 
control condition did not specifically emphasize saving.
By contrast, each of the three 2015 intervention 
conditions configured choice architecture to emphasize 
the two savings options: The first—and likely the most 
salient—savings option was to deposit the entire refund 
Figure 2. Deposit options shown to the control group (2015).
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Figure 3. Deposit screen shown to the Interactive Goal 
intervention group (2015). This intervention is an example of 
choice architecture combined with an interactive prompt.
Figure 4. Deposit options shown to the control group (2016).
Figure 5. Deposit screen shown to the Choice 
Architecture intervention group (2016). This condition 
only utilized choice architecture.
into a savings account, functionally anchoring filers to 
save 100% of their refund. The second option invited 
filers to split their refund between a savings account 
and some other account. Figure 3 presents a screenshot 
showing one of the three intervention conditions (the 
other two are shown in Appendix A of this report).
Each of the three intervention conditions employed 
a different messaging strategy. Messages in the first 
condition emphasized the importance of saving for 
emergencies (the Precautionary Saving condition), 
messages in the second one used an interactive 
prompt to encourage participants to think about 
future goals (the Interactive Goal condition), and 
messages in the third condition used an interactive 
prompt to encourage thinking about hopes for 
retirement (the Interactive Retirement condition). 
The interface allowed the user to click on an image 
associated with each goal.
The 2016 R2S Interventions
As this report shows, changes to the choice architecture 
in 2015 led to strong increases in the rate at which 
filers deposited their tax refund into a savings vehicle. 
However, we noticed that the overall levels of interaction 
with the interactive messaging prompts were low: Only 
1.4% of filers clicked on the interactive prompts in the 
Interactive Goal condition, and only 0.5% clicked on the 
prompts in the Interactive Retirement condition. The 
2016 interventions therefore built on the 2015 work by 
developing interventions designed to enhance the effect 
of messaging. It also structured the interventions to get 
clear experimental reads on the impact of different types 
of messaging.
For the 2016 intervention, filers saw either the control 
condition or one of three treatment conditions that 
emphasized saving the refund (Figures 4, 5, and 6).5 The 
three treatment conditions in 2016 sought to allow a 
comparison of the effects of choice architecture alone 
and its effects in combination with different messaging 
approaches. Language in the two messaging conditions 
referenced saving for emergencies. Participants in one, 
the Choice Architecture + Noninteractive Emergency 
Messaging group, were shown a passive prompt with 
messaging around the need for emergency savings. 
Participants in the other, the Choice Architecture + 
Interactive Emergency Messaging group, were shown 
an interactive prompt that invited them to identify 
their emergency savings needs. To overcome the 
lack of engagement with the 2015 prompts, the 2016 
experiment attempted to increase the salience of this 
interactive element; the message was put on its own 
screen (in 2015, it was shown on the side of the deposit 
screen), and the choices made there were incorporated 
into a second messaging prompt on the filing screen 
(see Figures 7 and 8 for illustrations). Interaction with 
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the prompt was not required, however, and filers could 
skip the screen if they chose. In addition to encouraging 
savings deposits among LMI tax filers, a goal of the 2016 
savings interventions was to isolate the effects of choice 
architecture independent of those from messaging while 
comparing a messaging strategy that strongly promoted 
participant engagement with one that did not.
Methods
Sample and Data
Participants
The thresholds to qualify for the TTFE product change 
slightly from year to year. In general, filers must receive 
the EITC, have relatively low income, or be on active 
military duty and have income below a specified 
threshold. In 2015, tax filers qualified for TTFE if 
they had an adjusted gross income (AGI) of less than 
$31,000, if they qualified for the EITC, or if a member 
of their household was on active military duty and the 
household had an AGI of less than $60,000. In 2016, 
the EITC and general income thresholds remained the 
same, but the qualifying military AGI threshold was 
$61,000. In each year, most TTFE filers qualified by 
meeting the general income-threshold requirement.
Both the 2015 and the 2016 experiments ran for the 
entirety of their respective tax seasons. The total 
sample in 2015 consisted of 646,116 participants who 
filed their taxes with TTFE and received a tax refund. 
In 2016, the sample consisted of 284,125 TTFE tax 
filers who received a refund.6
Data Collection
The R2S Initiative draws data from two primary sources: 
administrative tax data on TTFE filers and longitudinal 
data from the HFS. Participation and response rates are 
summarized in Table 2.
Administrative Tax Data from TTFE.—Intuit provides 
the aggregated, anonymized administrative data on all 
TTFE users receiving refunds. This data set includes 
information on filing status (e.g., single, married 
and filing jointly, or married and filing separately), 
number of dependents, age, income, tax credits, 
tax deductions, and amount of refund received. 
The data set also includes indicators identifying 
the experimental condition to which each filer was 
assigned and, if applicable, how each interacted 
with the intervention (i.e., whether the filer clicked 
on an interactive messaging prompt). In addition, a 
variety of measures indicate how filers allocated their 
refund: how they chose to receive their refund (e.g., 
direct deposit or paper check), whether they split the 
Figure 6. Deposit screen shown to the Choice Architecture 
+ Emergency Messaging intervention group (2016). This 
condition used both choice architecture and a noninteractive prompt 
to promote saving.
Figure 7. The first deposit screen shown to the Choice 
Architecture + Interactive Emergency Messaging 
intervention group (2016). This condition used an interactive 
prompt on its own screen to encourage participant engagement 
with the message.
Figure 8. The second deposit screen shown to the 
Choice Architecture + Interactive Emergency Messaging 
intervention group (2016). The second screen incorporated 
any selections made on the first screen into another, noninteractive 
prompt emphasizing emergency saving as well as choice architecture.
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refund, whether they purchased U.S. savings bonds, 
and whether they deposited any of the refund into 
a savings vehicle, as well as the amount of refund 
deposited to savings or checking.
For the general impact evaluation of R2S, the research 
team uses this aggregated, deidentified tax data on 
hundreds of thousands of TTFE tax filers. Provided 
by Intuit in a manner consistent with U.S. laws and 
regulations, these data enable the team to analyze the 
filing behavior of different groups (e.g., the control 
and treatment groups, filers who claim the EITC and 
those who do not). We also receive individual-level 
tax data on TTFE filers who consent to share their 
administrative data and participate in the HFS.
Longitudinal Data from the HFS.—Immediately after 
participants submit their tax returns, a screen in TTFE 
randomly invites half of refund-receiving filers to 
participate in the HFS. Administered using Qualtrics 
online software, the HFS takes about 20 minutes to 
complete. Participants are allowed to skip questions, 
and they receive a $5 online Amazon.com gift card 
as compensation for their participation. After filing 
their taxes, 14,993 R2S participants completed HFS1 
in 2015, and 5,146 of these completed HFS2. In 2016, 
13,316 R2S participants completed HFS1 and 5,636 
completed HFS2.7
The HFS covers a wide array of financial topics, 
querying participants about what they plan to do 
with their tax refund, how much debt they owe, the 
value of their assets, whether they could come up 
with $2,000 in an emergency, their experiences 
with material hardship, and whether they have 
faced financial shocks. Six months after filing their 
taxes, those who participated in HFS1 are invited to 
complete HFS2, which asks about their actual use of 
the refunds and any changes in financial status. At the 
Table 2. Participation and Response Summary by R2S 
Data Source
R2S Intervention Year
Data 2015 2016
Tax-time experiment
No. of control participants 161,952 70,978
No. of treatment participants 484,164 213,147
Household Financial Survey
% of TTFE filers offered survey 50.0 50.0
HFS1 take-up rate 4.6 5.4
HFS2 take-up rate 34.3 42.3
Note. R2S = Refund to Savings Initiative; TTFE = TurboTax Freedom 
Edition; HFS1 = Household Financial Survey, first wave; HFS2 = 
Household Financial Survey, second wave.
beginning of the survey process, participants grant 
consent enabling Intuit to share the individual-level 
tax data. This ensures that R2S researchers have robust 
administrative tax data for every HFS participant. 
Analytical Strategy—Tax Time Impact
Evaluating the impact of R2S on tax-time savings 
behaviors is fairly straightforward. The randomization 
of TTFE filers into a control group and intervention 
conditions should minimize the imbalance between 
groups, and so we estimated the impact of R2S 
through an intent-to-treat measure that captured the 
average impact of the intervention for each treatment 
group relative to that for the control group: 
ITT = YO − YC , (1)
where YO was the average outcome for the group 
exposed to the R2S interventions, and YC was the 
average outcome for the control group. Outcomes 
explored in this analysis included the rate at which 
filers deposited the refund into a savings vehicle, 
the amount deposited into savings, the rate at which 
they split the refund between a savings vehicle and a 
different account, and the rate at which they deposited 
the entire refund to savings.
R2S Results
Participant Characteristics
In total, 646,116 TTFE users participated in the R2S 
experiment in 2015 and 284,125 participated in 
2016. The reported characteristics of the two groups 
were similar. As Table 3 shows, the mean age of 
TTFE was around 35 years, about two thirds filed as 
single, around 30% had dependents, and the average 
household AGI was between $14,000 and $15,000.8
The refund-related characteristics of the two groups 
were also similar across 2015 and 2016. The average 
federal tax refund was around $2,000. Filers had 
about $420 in tax liability and withheld around 
$1,100. Approximately 40% received the EITC, and 
the average EITC was around $2,300. About 11.5% 
deposited any of their refund into a savings vehicle, 
and very few filers split their refund between accounts.
Understanding the Financial Lives  
of Filers Through the HFS
As described previously, the HFS provides a wealth 
of information regarding the financial lives of TTFE 
users. This includes data on account ownership, access 
to credit, experience with hardship, employment 
status, demographic information, and use of 
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Table 3. Characteristics of R2S Participants (2015 and 2016)
% or Mean (SD)
Characteristic 2015 2016
Age (mean, in years) 35.3 (15.5) 35.3 (16.2)
Filing status (%)
Single 66.8 68.6
Head of household 22.9 22.2
Married, filing jointly, widow(er) 9.4 8.4
Married, filing separately 0.9 0.8
Any dependents (%) 31.4 29.5
No. of dependents (mean) 0.5 (0.9) 0.5 (0.9)
Adjusted gross income ($) 14,846 (9,896) 14,409 (9,902)
Tax-related characteristics
Federal tax refund ($) 2,030 (2,379) 1,955 (2,375)
Federal tax liability ($) 422 (706) 423 (707)
Amount withheld ($) 1,077 (1,138) 1,078 (1,139)
% receiving EITC 41.9 39.6
EITC amount ($) 2,358 (1,923) 2,357 (1,923)
% depositing any refund into savings 11.7 12.2
% who split refund 2.2 1.5
Observations 646,116 284,125
Note. R2S = Refund to Savings; TTFE = TurboTax Freedom Edition; 
EITC = Earned Income Tax Credit.
alternative financial services such as payday loans 
or check cashers. As Table 4 illustrates, a majority of 
HFS participants in the 2016 HFS1 owned savings 
or checking accounts, although the rate of savings-
account ownership lagged behind that of checking-
account ownership. Almost 70% owned a credit 
card, about a third were students, and over three 
fourths were employed. Looking specifically at the 
financial characteristics of this sample, we see that 
most members were fairly liquidity constrained. The 
median reported liquid assets for participants was 
$720, with $200 in median credit card debt. Just under 
half of participants said they could come up with 
$2,000 in an emergency. Overall, participants in the 
2016 R2S closely resembled participants in 2015.
The HFS also provides information on financial 
shocks and material hardships that participants 
encountered in the 6 months prior to the survey. In 
total, 54.2% of participants in the 2016 HFS reported 
experiencing a financial shock in the 6 months prior to 
the survey. As Figure 9 illustrates, the most commonly 
reported shocks were unexpected car repairs (31.1%) 
and unexpected reductions in income (21.1%). The 
prevalence of reported material hardship was even 
more troubling. Over 60% of participants reported 
experiencing a hardship in the 6 months prior to the 
survey. Forty percent reported skipping a bill, 27.9% 
experienced food insecurity, and 16.0% were unable to 
pay their full rent or mortgage (Figure 10). Additionally, 
substantial percentages of respondents skipped some 
sort of health care service—a doctor visit, a dentist visit, 
or getting a prescription filled—because they could 
not afford it. Taken together, these results suggest that 
financial shocks were common among the 2016 HFS 
participants but that they had limited assets and limited 
access to emergency resources to manage these shocks. 
The findings therefore illustrate the challenge and 
the importance of the R2S Initiative. This population, 
although likely to benefit from increased savings, may 
also struggle to cover day-to-day expenses. Those 
struggles make saving difficult.
The Impact of R2S at Tax Time
The Impact of the 2015 R2S Interventions
Figure 11 illustrates the impact of R2S interventions 
on the key outcome variable in the experiment: The 
rate at which filers deposit any of their tax refund 
into a savings vehicle. Relative to the control group, 
all 2015 R2S treatment conditions substantially 
increased the total rate of filers depositing any of 
their refund to a savings vehicle. In the control 
group, 8.5% of filers deposited any of the refund to 
savings. In comparison, some portion of the refund 
was deposited to a savings vehicle by 13.4% of the 
Table 4. Household Financial Survey  
Participant Characteristics (2016)
Characteristic % or $
Owns savings account 73.4
Owns checking account 93.6
Owns credit card 66.7
Median credit debt ($)a 200
Median liquid assets ($)b 720
$2,000 in emergency 49.2
Used alternative financial services 27.4
Transaction servicesc 17.4
Credit servicesd 18.2
Student 32.8
Employed 77.0
Race
White, non-Hispanic 72.1
Black, non-Hispanic 7.7
Asian, non-Hispanic 4.9
Hispanic 9.6
Note. N = 13,316. 
a Respondents who did not own credit cards were listed as having 
$0 in credit card debt.
b Includes value of savings account, checking account, and cash on 
hand.
c Includes check cashers, money orders, and wire transfers.
d Includes payday loans, pawn shops, auto-title loans, rent-to-own 
services, and payroll cards.
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0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
Unexpected reduction in income
Unexpected medical expense
Unexpected home/appliance repair
Life change (e.g., birth/death in family)
Lost job
Unexpected legal fees
Victim of crime
Experienced a natural disaster
Any shock 54.2%
1.9%
5.8%
7.1%
13.6%
13.4%
14.7%
16.4%
20.8%
Figure 9. Percentages of 2016 Household Financial Survey participants who reported experiencing any financial shock 
and particular financial shocks (n = 13,316).
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
Skipped a bill
Put o going to the dentist
Experienced food insecurity
Overdrew a bank account
Put o going to the doctor
Had a credit card application rejected
Did not pay full rent or mortgage
Could not fill/put o filling a prescription
Had a credit card declined
Any hardship 62.2%
12.1%
19.2%
16.0%
24.5%
25.7%
26.1%
27.9%
35.3%
40.4%
Figure 10. Percentages of 2016 Household Financial Survey participants who reported experiencing any hardship and 
particular hardships in the prior 6 months (n = 13,316).
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Figure 11. Rate of depositing any of the refund to a 
savings vehicle, 2015 (N = 646,116). 
***p < .001 (different from control).
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Figure 12. Dollar amount deposited to savings vehicles, 
2015 (N = 646,116). 
***p < .001 (different from control).
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Precautionary Saving intervention group, 12.6% of the 
Interactive Goal group, and 12.5% of the Interactive 
Retirement group. The impacts were highly significant 
across all intervention conditions. Precautionary 
Saving, the condition with the largest effect, included 
an emergency savings message, and exposure to that 
condition led to a 58% increase in the rate of refund 
savings deposits. This condition was also significantly 
more effective than the two interactive conditions, 
though the absolute differences were not large.
As Figure 12 illustrates, the 2015 R2S interventions 
increased the average amount of refund deposited 
to savings, and the average for each of the three 
treatment groups was significantly higher than that 
for the control group. In the most effective condition, 
the Precautionary Saving intervention, filers deposited 
$244 to a savings vehicle on average; in comparison, 
the average deposited by the control group was $160, 
a 53% difference. The other two conditions increased 
average savings deposits by similar levels.
Given the finding that the 2015 interventions increased 
both the rate of savings deposits and the amount 
deposited, it is important to understand whether 
the savings increases were driven by increases in the 
amount deposited to savings or simply by the increases 
in the rate of savings deposits. To assess this, we focused 
on the amounts deposited into savings vehicles by 
those who opted to make savings deposits, finding that 
the average savings deposits by savings depositors in 
the control group ($1,886) were significantly higher 
than those by depositors in the treatment groups: 
On average, the Precautionary Saving depositors 
placed $1,824 of the refund into savings vehicles, the 
Interactive Goal depositors placed $1,817 into savings, 
and the Interactive Retirement depositors placed 
$1,834 into savings. This indicates that the impact of 
the R2S interventions stemmed not from encouraging 
filers to deposit more of their refund into a savings 
account but rather from encouraging more people to 
deposit their refund into savings.
Figures 13 and 14 illustrate why this might be the case. 
Figure 13 depicts the rates at which filers split their 
refund between a savings account and some other ac-
count, and Figure 14 shows the rates at which filers 
deposited their entire refund into a savings account. 
Taken together, these results show that the most typical 
behavior among those who deposited any of the refund 
to a savings account was to deposit the entire refund 
into savings. Around 12% of tax filers in the treatment 
groups chose the option of depositing the entire re-
fund into a savings account, and approximately 1% split 
the refund into more than one account. This further 
suggests that the impact of the R2S interventions is ex-
tensive rather than intensive; that is, the interventions 
drive more people to make savings deposits, rather 
than driving people to deposit more to savings. This re-
sult is to be expected in an environment where people’s 
preferences are to deposit solely into one account.
However, these results indicate that the R2S 
interventions also increased the rate of splitting. 
Around 0.9% of the treatment condition filers split their 
refund, compared to 0.7% of the control filers. This may 
be due in part to the fact that the choice architecture of 
the 2015 intervention emphasized splitting, which was 
the second option given in the treatment conditions. In 
the control condition, the splitting option was shown 
at the bottom of the list and did not mention saving. 
Despite this difference, it is worth noting that overall 
rates of splitting were low across conditions.
The Impact of the 2016 R2S Interventions
In general, the results from the 2016 R2S savings 
interventions (n = 284,125) were similar to those from 
the 2015 experiment. In each intervention group, the 
percentage of tax filers depositing any of their refund 
into a savings vehicle was higher than the percentage of 
control-group filers who did so (Figure 15). Specifically, 
9.2% of filers in the control group deposited any of 
their refund to savings; the same was true of 13.2% in 
the Choice Architecture group, 13.4% in the Choice 
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Figure 13. Rate of splitting between multiple accounts, 
2015 (N = 646,116). 
***p < .001 (different from control).
Figure 14. Rate of filers depositing whole refund to savings 
vehicle, 2015 (N = 646,116).
***p < .001 (different from control).
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Architecture + Noninteractive Emergency Messaging 
group, and 12.9% in the Choice Architecture + 
Interactive Emergency Messaging group. Interestingly, 
the effects of choice architecture alone appear to be 
similar to the effects of combining choice architecture 
with emergency messaging. This suggests that the 
choice architecture element of the intervention may be 
the primary driver of the increased savings deposits. 
In 2016 as in 2015, average savings deposit amounts 
were higher for all intervention groups than for 
the control group (Figure 16). Both of the groups 
exposed to a combination of choice architecture and 
emergency messaging had average savings deposits 
of $222. The average for the control group was $162, 
and that for the Choice Architecture group was $215. 
Again, we see that the effect of choice architecture by 
itself was similar to the effect of combining choice 
architecture with emergency messaging.
Finally, the 2016 R2S interventions enabled us to 
document a highly significant increase in the percentage 
of filers depositing their entire refund into savings 
(Figure 17). The percentage of filers depositing the whole 
refund into savings was highest among the Choice 
Architecture + Noninteractive Emergency Messaging 
group (12.84%) and lowest among counterparts in the 
0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14%
Choice Architecture + 
Interactive Msg.
Choice Architecture + 
Noninteractive Msg.
Choice Architecture
Control 9.2%
13.2%***
13.4%***
12.9%***
Figure 15. Deposits to savings: All interventions, 2016 
(n = 284,125). Msg. = message. 
***p < .001 (different from control).
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Figure 16. Average savings deposits by intervention, 2016 
(n = 284,125). Msg. = message. 
***p < .001 (different from control).
control group (8.74%). As with the other results, the 
effects of the Choice Architecture condition were 
similar to those of the two conditions combining choice 
architecture with emergency messaging.
We also examined the impact of the interactive 
messaging prompt itself. As noted above, one 
innovation implemented in 2016 was to incorporate 
a highly salient interactive messaging prompt that 
encouraged filers to identify the types of emergencies 
for which they would be saving their refund. This was 
motivated by two findings from the 2015 iteration of 
R2S: First, emergency messaging was more effective 
than other messaging related to financial goals (either 
general goals or retirement goals), and second, filers did 
not interact with prompts placed on the same screen 
where they were asked to select how they would like the 
refund to be deposited. To address these issues, the 2016 
interactive emergency messaging prompt was placed 
on its own screen rather than on the deposit screen. 
However, filers assigned to the 2016 Choice Architecture 
+ Interactive Emergency Messaging condition were not 
required to interact with the prompt.
The results from that intervention showed that a higher 
percentage of filers interacted with the prompt when 
it was shown on its own: 7.3% of filers interacted with it 
in 2016, but only 1.0% did so in 2015. This suggests that 
placing the prompt on a screen of its own increased the 
salience of the messaging. Despite this, the interactive 
prompt did not seem to be successful in driving tax-
time savings behavior. As noted above (Figure 15), 
refunds were deposited into savings by 12.93% of filers 
who saw the prompt as part of the Choice Architecture 
+ Interactive Emergency Messaging condition and by 
13.21% of those assigned to the Choice Architecture 
condition (with no message, a nonsignificant difference 
of .28 percentage points). When compared with the 
Choice Architecture + Noninteractive Emergency 
Messaging condition, which drove 13.44% of filers 
to make savings deposits, the Choice Architecture + 
Interactive Emergency Messaging condition actually 
0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14%
Choice Architecture 
+ Interactive Msg.
Choice Architecture 
+ Noninteractive Msg.
Choice Architecture
Control 8.7%
12.7%***
12.8%***
12.3%***
Figure 17. Percentages of filers depositing the entire 
refund into savings, by intervention, 2016 (N = 284,125). 
Msg. = message.
***p < .001 (different from control).
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led to a statistically significant 0.51 percentage-point 
reduction in the rate at which filers deposited into 
savings (p < .01). This lack of observed impact held when 
we restricted the analyses to those who interacted with 
the prompt, and it also held when we used regression 
techniques to control for the factors that might be 
associated with choosing to interact with the prompt.9
Discussion of the 2015 and 2016 R2S Interventions
The goal of the R2S interventions in both 2015 and 
2016, as in 2013, was to increase refund savings deposits 
among TTFE users at tax time in order to improve this 
population’s financial well-being. The 2013 intervention 
tested the effects of motivational messaging and 
anchoring on tax-time savings deposits, finding that 
the behavioral economics tools increased the rates at 
which filers saved and split their refund as well as the 
average amount deposited into savings. The 2015 and 
2016 interventions built on these findings by testing the 
effects of choice architecture and additional messaging 
strategies. Our analyses of data from both years found 
that each tested treatment yielded higher rates of 
savings deposits and higher amounts deposited to 
savings. Although the overall behavioral shifts effected 
through these low-touch interventions are impressive, 
the scale of the interventions leads to a substantial 
aggregate impact for the R2S population. Across the 
2015 and 2016 intervention years, R2S generated 
29,536 additional savers and an additional $48 million 
deposited to savings vehicles (see Figure 18).
Results from the 2015 R2S intervention suggested 
that choice architecture and each of the three 
messaging strategies were effective at increasing 
savings deposits. In the 2016 intervention, we 
sought to separate the effects of choice architecture 
from those of combining choice architecture with 
messaging. We found that choice architecture by 
itself is an effective driver of refund savings deposits 
and that the additional effects of messaging prompts 
are fairly minimal. Indeed, these results suggest that 
certain types of messaging may actually be harmful, 
as the rate of savings deposits generated by the 2016 
interactive prompt was significantly lower than the 
rate generated by the 2016 passive prompt. This 
result may have implications for the design of similar 
interventions: Incorporating interactive elements 
or elaborate messaging conditions may mitigate the 
impact of more passive interventions like changes to 
the choice architecture of a decision environment.
Across the 2015 and 2016 intervention years, R2S generated 29,536 additional savers  
and an additional $48 million deposited to savings
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Figure 18. Effects of 2015 and 2016 R2S on numbers of filers 
depositing and amounts deposited (2015 N = 646,116; 2016 
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Figure 19. Any of the refund deposited into savings: 
Control vs. best intervention, 2013, 2015, and 2016.
Both the 2015 and 2016 interventions yielded higher 
rates of savings deposits than those induced by the 
2013 intervention (Figure 19). It is interesting to note, 
however, that the savings deposit rate of the control 
group has increased year over year. Over this same 
period, the personal saving rate in the United States has 
been roughly stable (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
n.d.). It is possible that returning tax filers (those who 
use TTFE in multiple years) who are randomly assigned 
to a treatment group in one year are more likely to 
deposit their refund into savings if they are assigned 
to a control group in a subsequent year. Although not 
conclusive, this pattern may indicate that shifts in 
behavior during one tax year persist into the future.
16 // JUNE 2018
It is possible that returning tax filers … 
randomly assigned to a treatment group in 
one year are more likely to deposit their 
refund into savings if they are assigned to 
a control group in a subsequent year.
Part 3
The Impacts of R2S 6 Months After Tax Filing
The analyses reported above have established that 
low-touch interventions like those employed by R2S 
can make substantial impacts on savings behavior 
at tax time. However, those findings do not address 
whether the effects of the interventions persist over 
time. The 2013 R2S interventions demonstrated 
that filers exposed to certain R2S interventions were 
more likely than counterparts in the control group 
to have some of their refund saved 6 months after 
filing (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2015). Specifically, the 
likelihood of having some of the refund saved at the 
6-month mark was higher among filers exposed to 
higher suggested savings amounts (30%–31% relative to 
the 26% savings rate for the control group).
This section of the report extends that analysis by 
examining the impact of the 2015 interventions on 
refund savings 6 months after filing. Specifically, this 
section examines three questions around the 6-month 
impacts of the R2S interventions:
 What is the overall impact of the R2S 
interventions 6 months after tax filing?
 Are the R2S interventions more effective for 
households with persistent financial constraints 
than for other sampled households?
 How does access to emergency savings moderate 
the 6-month impact of R2S interventions?
Identifying a Target Population  
for the R2S 6-Month Analysis
In general, asset building initiatives like IDAs, CDAs, 
and R2S have been identified as means to help low-
income households improve their financial situation 
(Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2015; Marks, Engelhardt, 
Rhodes, & Wallace, 2014; Mills et al., 2016; Sherraden, 
1991). A challenge in understanding how those 
initiatives affect low-income households, however, 
is that the definition of low income—a designation 
typically based on household earnings—obscures 
important differences among households. For 
example, household income could be low due to a 
temporary circumstance, such as a spell of short-term 
unemployment or higher education enrollment, and 
it is likely that households in such situations will have 
higher earnings in the foreseeable future. Therefore, 
they are likely different from households experiencing 
multiyear spells of poverty due, for example, to 
employment in persistently low-wage occupations or 
to health issues that prevent full-time employment.
Distinguishing between transitory and long-term 
poverty is a well-established practice in the literature 
(e.g., Cellini, McKernan, & Ratcliffe, 2008; McKay, 
2009; McKernan & Ratcliffe, 2002). The distinction 
is borne out by historical estimates of the likelihood 
of a household leaving poverty. Research using the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics has found that the 
likelihood of exiting poverty over the course of a year is 
fairly high but drops rapidly as the duration of a poverty 
spell grows (Bane & Ellwood, 1986; Stevens, 1994).
Through these analyses, we also sought to understand 
the impact of the interventions on what might be 
considered the target population for R2S; that is, the 
population that likely stands to benefit the most from 
interventions to develop their emergency savings. 
The specification of a target population is important 
because the TTFE population, though almost entirely 
comprised of low-income households (other than 
a small percentage of higher income active-duty 
military households), is relatively heterogeneous. In 
2015, for example, 14% of filers reported unexpectedly 
losing a job during the 6 months prior to tax filing, 
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23% reported experiencing an unexpected reduction 
in income during that period, and 14% reported being 
unemployed in that time.10 Additionally, 34.2% of 
HFS respondents were students, and it is likely that 
their savings needs differed considerably from those 
of the general population. These results suggest that 
many of the households in the TTFE sample may be 
transitorily low income—that is, their income may 
have fallen below the threshold required for access to 
the free TTFE product, but they were not necessarily 
chronically low income or they were students whose 
financial circumstances were likely to shift significantly 
when they completed their education.
Although efforts to promote the accumulation of 
assets can have immensely beneficial effects in many 
LMI households, it is not clear that public policy 
should focus on savings accumulation in households 
experiencing temporary spells of poverty or in those 
with working-age members who are enrolled in 
school. Households with temporarily low income 
likely need the tax refund to maintain consumption 
until changes in circumstances lead to increases in 
earnings or until education is completed.
This understanding of the nature of poverty and 
the goals of asset-building programs enabled us to 
identify the target population for the R2S savings 
interventions: Households that experience persistent 
financial constraint but include no enrolled adult 
student at tax time. We define persistent financial 
constraint as multiple, consecutive years of low 
earnings. For these analyses, households are deemed 
to have persistent financial constraints if they are 
represented in TTFE data for at least two consecutive 
years (and therefore have income below TTFE’s 
threshold or receive the EITC). The HFS data are used 
to distinguish households that include adult students 
from households that do not.
Methods
Sample
The sample used in the 6-month analyses is similar 
to the sample used in the assessment of the tax-time 
impacts of the 2015 R2S interventions: Households that 
have annual AGI below $31,000, are EITC recipients, 
or include members on active duty in the U.S. military 
and have annual AGI below $60,000. There are two key 
differences between this sample and that drawn for the 
tax-time analyses. First, the 6-month analytic sample 
only includes households that completed both the 
first and second waves of the HFS. Second, we restrict 
the analyses to households that had savings accounts 
at tax time. The reason for this restriction is that the 
R2S interventions are largely targeted at those who 
have savings accounts. The goal of the interventions 
is to encourage deposits into savings vehicles, so we 
would not expect households that lack savings accounts 
to be impacted by the intervention. In total, 75% of 
households had savings accounts at tax time.
Data
The analyses of the 6-month impacts of the 
interventions drew almost exclusively upon data from 
the longitudinal HFS rather than upon administrative 
tax data provided by Intuit. As noted above (see p. 10 
of this report), half of refund-receiving TTFE users 
were invited to complete HFS1 immediately after filing 
their taxes; these filers were contacted again 6 months 
after filing and invited to take part in HFS2.
In total, 14,993 households in the R2S experiment 
completed HFS1 and 5,518 completed HFS2. After 
exclusions due to missing data, our full sample 
included 5,457 tax filers. Of these respondents, 4,443 
owned savings accounts and 1,194 of these met the 
criteria for our target population; that is, they were 
nonstudents with persistent financial constraints. 
The outcome variables for these analyses were drawn 
exclusively from HFS2. The control variables come 
from HFS1 and the administrative tax data.
Analytical Strategy—6 Month Impacts
The evaluation of the experiment’s tax time impacts 
leveraged the experimental design of R2S to directly 
compare the treatment and control groups’ savings 
behaviors when they filed their taxes. For the 6-month 
analyses, we generated regression-adjusted estimates 
of the 6-month impacts. This approach allowed us 
to control for any baseline differences between the 
control and treatment respondents who participated 
in the HFS2. It also enabled a more precise read on the 
overall impact of the treatments. For each outcome 
explored here, the impact is therefore the regression-
adjusted difference between 6-month outcomes for 
the treatment group and those for the control group.
For a subset of the 6-month analyses reported in 
this section, we examined how access to emergency 
financial resources interacted with the R2S savings 
interventions. This allowed us to assess whether R2S 
has helped build savings among households lacking 
substantial emergency resources that could help to 
buffer the effects of financial shocks.
Outcome Variables
Two outcome variables were used in these analyses. 
The first was an indicator variable capturing whether 
an HFS2 respondent had any of the refund saved 6 
months after filing. This variable was coded 1 if the 
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filer still had some of the refund and 0 otherwise. 
The other outcome variable was the proportion of the 
refund still saved 6 months after filing. This variable 
was measured on a scale from 0% to 100%.
Control Variables
Although the outcome variables for these analyses 
were measured 6 months after participants filed their 
taxes, the control variables were measured at the time 
of tax filing. The control variables came from both the 
administrative tax data and the data collected through 
HFS1. In analyzing the administrative data from filers’ 
tax forms, we controlled for the AGI and the federal 
tax-refund amount. In analyzing data from HFS1, we 
controlled for the following:
 The reported experience of any of seven material 
hardships in the 6 months prior to filing. The 
measured hardships stem directly from financial 
difficulties: self-reported occurrences of skipping 
rent, skipping any bills, skipping medical or 
dental care, skipping necessary prescriptions, 
being unable to afford the necessary type or 
amount of food, overdrawing a bank account, 
and having a credit card declined because the 
respondent’s balance exceeded the credit limit. 
Respondents were asked a series of yes-or-no 
questions about their experience with these 
hardships. The answers were coded as 1 if they 
had experienced any of these hardships and 0 
otherwise.
 The reported experience of any of seven 
financial shocks in the 6 months prior to filing. 
The shocks included the following: losing a 
job unexpectedly or having an unexpected 
reduction in income; having an unexpected 
home or vehicle repair; having unexpected 
legal expenses; having expenses due to a natural 
disaster; having unexpected, major, out-of-
pocket medical expenses; being the victim of a 
crime affecting finances or property; and having 
a major life change that affected the respondent 
financially (e.g., a divorce or the birth of a child). 
Respondents were asked a series of yes-or-no 
questions about their experience with these 
shocks, and their responses were coded as 1 if 
they had experienced any of these shocks and 0 
otherwise.
 Access to $2,000 in an emergency. Respondents 
were asked, “How confident are you that you could 
come up with $2,000 if an unexpected need arose 
within the next month?” If these respondents 
reported that they were “certain” or that they 
“could probably” come up with the full $2,000, the 
variable was coded as 1. If they reported that they 
were “certain” or that they “could probably” not 
come up with the full $2,000, it was coded as 0.
 The amount of self-reported credit card debt.
 Respondents’ budgeting behavior. Respondents 
were asked whether they identified with the 
following statement: “I budget carefully.” If they 
responded that the statement was “very much like 
me,” “mostly like me,” or “somewhat like me,” the 
variable was coded as 1. If they reported that the 
statement was “not much like me” or “not at all like 
me,” it was coded as 0.
These baseline controls were chosen because they 
succinctly captured many aspects of filers’ financial 
lives: behaviors, balance sheets, incomes, refund 
characteristics, the amount of volatility in their lives, 
and the financial constraints to which they were 
exposed. Controlling for these key financial indicators 
ensured that the treatment and control groups were 
as similar as possible and that estimates of treatment 
effects are precise. Although randomization should 
have balanced the groups, the use of control variables 
also enabled us to account for any imbalance that may 
have emerged from differential propensities among 
the groups to select into both waves of the HFS.
The 6-Month Impacts of R2S
What Is the Overall Impact of the R2S Intervention  
6 Months After Tax Filing?
Figure 20 presents estimates of the regression-
adjusted impact of R2S on the likelihood that tax 
filers had some of the refund saved after 6 months. In 
general, among LMI filers who could have deposited to 
savings at tax time (i.e., they owned savings accounts), 
there is a directional but nonsignificant relationship 
between assignment to the Precautionary Saving 
condition and having some of the refund saved after 6 
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Figure 20. Percentages of R2S participants who still had 
some refund saved 6 months after filing (n = 4,443).
Filers in the Precautionary Saving condition had a 
significantly higher proportion of the refund in savings 
after 6 months: On average, filers exposed to this condition 
saved 5% more of their refund than did counterparts in the 
control group. Given the average refund of this population 
($2,052), the increase translates to an additional $100 in 
savings 6 months after filing
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months: 37.9% of filers assigned to that condition still 
had some refund saved, but the same was true for only 
35.0% of the control group (an 8% difference; p = .13). 
The other conditions appeared to be less effective at 
driving saving 6 months after tax filing.
Are the R2S Interventions More Effective for 
Households With Persistent Financial Constraints?
As we explained above, the target population for 
R2S interventions consists of households that 
have persistent financial constraints but no adult 
members enrolled in school. This is the population 
typically targeted by asset-building initiatives aimed 
at decreasing poverty. As Figure 21 illustrates, these 
households benefitted disproportionately from the 
R2S interventions. In each treatment condition, 
the percentage of filers with some of the refund 
in savings after 6 months was higher than the 
percentage of control-group filers with savings at 
that point. The Precautionary Saving condition was 
the most effective at driving increased savings rates: 
Filers in this condition were 10 percentage points 
more likely than counterparts in the control group to 
have any of the refund saved after 6 months (p < .01).
Figure 22 illustrates the regression-adjusted 
proportions of the refunds saved across treatment 
groups, relative to the control group. Only filers in 
the Precautionary Saving condition had a significantly 
higher proportion of the refund in savings after 6 
months: On average, filers exposed to this condition 
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Figure 21. Percentages of R2S participants with persistent 
financial constraints and some refund saved 6 months 
after filing (n = 1,194).
†p < .10; **p < .01 (different from control).
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Figure 22. Proportions of refunds saved 6 months after 
filing among R2S participants with persistent financial 
constraints (n = 1,194).
†p < .10 (different from control).
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saved 5% more of their refund than did counterparts 
in the control group. Given the average refund of 
this population ($2,052), the increase translates to an 
additional $100 in savings 6 months after filing.
How Does Access to Emergency Savings  
Moderate the 6-Month Impact of the  
R2S Interventions Among Constrained Households?
Having established that the R2S interventions were 
associated with increased savings 6 months after 
filing among households with persistent financial 
constraints, we examined how this impact was 
moderated by access to a substantial amount of 
emergency resources. Figure 23 shows the regression-
adjusted 6-month R2S results among two groups 
of households with persistent financial constraints: 
households reporting that they could access $2,000 
in an emergency at the time of tax filing and those 
reporting that they could not. The results show that 
the 6-month benefits of R2S are concentrated among 
those who were unable to access such resources, and 
the largest effect was observed among filers in the 
Precautionary Saving condition. Specifically, filers in 
the Precautionary Saving condition who could not 
access $2,000 in an emergency were almost twice 
as likely as filers in the control group to have any 
of the refund saved after 6 months. The finding is 
compelling because this was the only condition in 
which the intervention explicitly tied the refund to 
saving for emergencies. The finding may indicate 
that, though variation in messaging at tax time had 
little impact on tax-time savings deposits, certain 
types of messages can help shift filers’ savings 
behaviors in the period after filing.
Among households with persistent financial 
constraints and access to $2,000 in emergencies, 
the impact of R2S was less pronounced and not 
statistically significant. This is perhaps unsurprising. 
The need to build savings with the refund was 
probably less pressing for those households.
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Figure 23. Percentages of households that had persistent 
financial constraints and any refund saved 6 months after 
filing. Ability to access $2,000 in an emergency was reported 
at tax time (n = 1,194). 
*p < .01 (different from control).
Discussion of the  
6-Month Impacts of R2S
The results of the 6-month analyses of the 2015 R2S 
interventions presented here are mixed but ultimately 
very encouraging. On average, filers assigned to an 
R2S treatment group and those assigned to the control 
group did not differ significantly in the amount of the 
refund still in savings 6 months after filing, despite 
the fact that the R2S treatments were associated 
with large changes in savings depositing behaviors 
relative to the control. However, there were substantial 
improvements among filers with persistent financial 
constraints, and they likely have the most need to 
build savings. The most effective treatment condition, 
which combined choice architecture with messaging 
that emphasized saving the refund for emergencies, 
led to around a third more filers with persistent 
financial constraints having some of the refund saved 
6 months after filing—a difference of 10 percentage 
points from the rate among filers in the control 
group. These results were even stronger for those 
without access to substantial emergency resources 
though … messaging at tax time had little impact on tax-time 
savings deposits, certain types of messages can help shift 
filers’ savings behaviors in the period after filing.
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The impacts of these interventions, both at tax 
time and 6 months after filing, are somewhat 
remarkable given that the interventions add 
less than 10 seconds to the entire tax-filing 
process. This demonstrates that even extremely 
low-touch interventions have the potential to 
substantially shift individual behaviors and 
that these impacts can last over time.
at tax time (defined as being able to access $2,000 in 
an emergency); the treatment condition focusing on 
emergency savings effectively doubled the 6-month 
refund savings rate among filers with persistent 
financial constraints.
It is worth noting the relationship between the impacts 
of these interventions and the relative time involved in 
the interventions. Compared with filers in the control 
group, members of the 2015 R2S treatment groups 
spent 3.6 seconds more on the intervention screens 
that incorporated one of three messaging conditions 
and choice architecture emphasizing savings. 
Despite this small amount of time, the interventions 
demonstrated large impacts in driving behavior at tax 
time and led to increased savings for a key population 
even 6 months after filing.
Conclusion and Policy Implications
This report presents the impacts of the Refund to 
Savings Initiative in the years of 2015 and 2016. The 
fundamental idea underlying R2S is that tax time 
represents an important opportunity to address the 
low rates of saving observed among LMI households 
in the United States, and the low rates of emergency 
saving in particular. The tax refund is the largest 
amount of money many LMI households receive all 
year. The tax moment is therefore an opportunity 
for holistic consideration of household finances and 
financial goals. Intervention at tax time may help 
these households build savings—an accomplishment 
that is perhaps beyond their ability through the rest of 
the year.
The R2S interventions primarily used two techniques 
informed by behavioral economics—the use of 
persuasive message and choice architecture—to 
encourage LMI filers to deposit their tax refund into 
a savings vehicle such as a savings account or U.S. 
savings bond. The results demonstrate that these tax-
time interventions were very successful at changing 
the refund depositing behavior of LMI tax filers. In 
2015, the most successful intervention combined 
choice architecture with messaging around the need 
to build emergency savings. That intervention resulted 
in a 58% increase in the rate at which filers deposited 
their refund into a savings vehicle. Similar results were 
observed in 2016.
Although more mixed than the findings on the 
intervention effects at tax time, the findings 
concerning the interventions’ impacts on savings 
held 6 months after tax filing are still very 
encouraging. In general, we observed directional 
increases in the 6-month savings rates of treatment 
participants relative to the rate among counterparts 
in the control group, but these effects were not 
statistically significant. However, in analyzing the 
6-month impacts of R2S interventions, we observed 
pronounced and significant differences among the 
sampled households that faced persistent financial 
constraints. These results were even stronger for 
households that lacked emergency savings and were 
exposed to messaging around the importance of 
saving the tax refund for emergencies.
The impacts of these interventions, both at tax time 
and 6 months after filing, are somewhat remarkable 
given that the interventions add less than 10 seconds 
to the entire tax-filing process.11 This demonstrates 
that even extremely low-touch interventions have the 
potential to substantially shift individual behaviors 
and that these impacts can last over time.
The findings presented in this report have a number 
of implications for policy and practice. First and 
foremost, the results demonstrate that tax time can 
serve as a key moment to promote savings in LMI 
households. Although tax credits like the EITC can 
enhance the financial security of working tax filers, 
many LMI households likely need additional support 
and incentives to build emergency savings or to save 
for other long-term purposes.
Our findings also offer lessons for the design of similar 
interventions. The first is that choice architecture is 
a stronger driver of behavior change than persuasive 
messaging is. This may be due to the nature of tax 
filing: The R2S interventions occur near the very end 
of the tax-filing process, when tax filers may be tired 
or inattentive from filling out their taxes. As such, 
interventions that require minimal engagement or 
that make saving as simple as possible—for example, 
making saving the entire tax refund the most 
salient deposit option—may be more effective than 
interventions that require filers to read and consider 
different messages.
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However, messaging can still have an incremental 
impact on savings behavior. Another implication 
from this work is that messaging on emergency 
savings is somewhat more effective than messaging 
on general financial goals or on retirement savings. 
This is unsurprising. Among LMI households, saving 
for emergencies is likely a more pressing priority 
than saving for general goals or retirement. Levels 
of emergency savings are generally low in these 
households and financial shocks are relatively frequent.
Of course, there is also evidence that messaging—
though less effective at changing tax time behaviors—
is effective at changing downstream behaviors. Filers 
who lacked emergency savings at tax time appeared 
to respond to the emergency messaging they received 
through the R2S intervention; the percentage of 
filers with some of the refund still in savings at the 
6-month mark was higher among those exposed to 
the emergency messaging than among filers in other 
interventions.
Finally, these findings have implications for the 
measurement of tax-time savings interventions. Many 
Volunteer Income Tax Assistance sites promote tax 
refund saving. They often identify tax-refund savers 
as those who split their refund between a savings 
account (or U.S. savings bonds) and some other 
account. However, the R2S Initiative has consistently 
shown that rates of splitting are very low among LMI 
tax filers. In 2015, members of the control group 
split their refunds at a rate of 0.7%, and those in 
the treatment groups split their refunds at a rate of 
0.9%—despite a choice architecture that emphasized 
splitting the refund into a savings account as the 
second-most salient deposit option. In 2013, an even 
greater emphasis was placed on splitting the refund. 
Despite the use of savings anchors that encouraged 
filers to save a given percentage of the refund or a 
specific dollar amount, split rates were relatively low 
(Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2015). These findings clearly 
suggest that LMI tax filers have an overwhelming bias 
in favor of depositing the refund into a single account. 
Practitioners should therefore consider orienting their 
savings programs to emphasize depositing the entire 
refund into savings.
The R2S Initiative demonstrates that small changes 
to tax filers’ decision-making environment can have 
substantial impacts on savings behavior. Future 
R2S experiments will continue to explore the use 
of behavioral economics tools in order to optimize 
tax-time financial-security interventions. The R2S 
Initiative will also continue to study the persistence 
of the effects of tax-time interventions on LMI 
households’ financial behavior and well-being.
Appendixes
Appendix A 
2015 R2S Intervention:  
Precautionary Savings and Interactive Retirement Conditions
Figure A1. The deposit screen shown to the Precautionary 
Saving intervention group.
Figure A1. The deposit screen shown to the Interactive 
Retirement intervention group.
26 // JUNE 2018
Table B1. Participant Characteristics by 2015 R2S Intervention Group
Characteristic Control Precautionary Saving
Interactive  
Goal
Interactive  
Retirement
Demographics
Age (mean, in years) 35.28 (15.48) 35.25 (15.44) 35.18 (15.46) 35.27 (15.50)
Filing status (%)
Single 66.8 66.8 66.9 66.8
Head of household 22.9 22.9 22.7 22.9
Married, filing jointly 9.3 9.3 9.4 9.3
% with any dependents 31.4 31.4 31.3 31.4
No. of dependents (mean) 0.54 (0.94) 0.53 (0.93) 0.54 (0.94) 0.54 (0.94)
Adjusted gross income ($) 14,862 (9,902) 14,847 (9,893) 14,809 (9,904) 14,864 (9,887)
Tax-related characteristics
Federal tax refund ($) 2,035 (2,373) 2,026 (2,382) 2,025 (2,388) 2,033 (2,373)
Federal tax liability ($) 426 (711) 428 (710) 423 (706) 427 (711)
Amount withheld ($) 1,105 (1,147) 1,104 (1,182) 1,102 (1,175) 1,108 (1,141)
% receiving EITC 42.0 42.0 41.8 41.8
EITC amount ($) 2,290 (1,875) 2,279 $1,872) 2,283 (1,873) 2,295 (1,877)
Observations 161,952 161,011 161,936 161,217
Note. R2S = Refund to Savings Initiative; EITC = Earned Income Tax Credit. No significant 
differences across intervention groups. Standard deviations shown in parentheses.
Table B1. Participant Characteristics by 2016 R2S Intervention Group
Characteristic Control CA Only CA + Emer. Message
CA + 
Interactive 
Emer. Prompt
Demographics
Age (mean, in years) 35.23 (16.17) 35.22 (16.1) 35.15 (16.17) 35.27* (16.24)
Filing status (%)
Single 68.5 68.8 68.6 68.5
Head of household 22.3 22.1 22.1 22.1
Married, filing jointly 8.3 8.2 8.5 8.5*
% with any dependents 29.6 29.3 29.5 29.4
No. of dependents (mean) 0.50 (0.91) 0.50 (0.91) 0.50 (0.9) 0.50 (0.91)
Adjusted gross income ($) 14,433 (9,922) 14,344 (9,877) 14,432 (9,915) 14,428 (9,848)
Tax-related characteristics
Federal tax refund ($) 1,959 (2,377) 1,952 (2,377) 1,956 (2,375) 1,952 (2,373)
Federal tax liability ($) 426 (708) 420 (707) 424 (710) 422 (702)
Amount withheld ($) 1,079 (1,144) 1,077 (1,142) 1,080 (1,134) 1,077 (1,133)
% receiving EITC 39.6 39.6 39.6 39.7
EITC amount ($) 2,375 (1,923) 2,347* (1,920) 2,362 (1,925) 2,344* (1,923)
Observations 70,978 70,928 71,306 70,913
Note. R2S = Refund to Savings Initiative; CA = choice architecture; Emer. = emergency; 
EITC = Earned Income Tax Credit. Standard deviations shown in parentheses.
*p < .10, different from other groups
Appendix B 
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Notes
1. TurboTax Freedom Edition is freely available to 
certain filers as part of the Internal Revenue Service’s 
Free File Program. For more information, see 
https://www.irs.gov/uac/about-the-free-file-program.
2. As used in this report and in other work by the 
R2S Initiative, the term splitting refers to the act of 
depositing a refund into more than one account—
for example, into a checking account and a savings 
account.
3. As detailed elsewhere in this report, the R2S 
Initiative collects data through the Household 
Financial Survey (HFS). The first wave of this 
longitudinal survey (HFS1) is conducted with filers 
immediately after they file their taxes, and the 
second is conducted 6 months later (HFS2).
4. All screenshots of TurboTax Freedom Edition 
are considered proprietary. Copyright is held by 
Intuit, Inc.
5. The 2016 R2S experiment also included a 
component devoted to the myRA savings program. 
The R2S team partnered with the U.S. Department 
of the Treasury to study the retirement needs of 
LMI tax filers, to test different messaging strategies, 
and to experiment with interventions that used 
behavioral economics to promote myRA sign-up at 
tax time. The sample sizes reported for the regular 
2016 R2S interventions reflect the fact that the total 
participant pool was divided into seven groups: a 
control group, three savings intervention groups, 
and three myRA intervention groups. The results of 
the 2016 myRA experiment are reported elsewhere.
6. These numbers represent a subset of TTFE filers 
who received a tax refund. A subset of TTFE 
participants were not randomly assigned to either 
a treatment or control condition, typically because 
they started the tax filing process in a different 
TurboTax product before switching to TTFE. Filers 
that did this were not part of the R2S experiment. 
In total, 206,122 TTFE filers who received a tax 
refund were not assigned to an experimental 
condition in 2015 and 254,514 were not assigned to 
an experimental condition in 2016.
7. Because some TTFE tax filers were not assigned 
to an experimental condition (see Note 2), 
these numbers represent a subset of the total 
respondents to the HFS. In total, 5,101 HFS1 
respondents were not randomly assigned to an 
experimental condition in 2015 and 9,451 HFS1 
respondents were not randomly assigned to an 
experimental condition in 2016.
8. See Appendix B for an examination of participant 
characteristics across different treatment conditions.
9. Although the analysis of the average treatment 
impacts of R2S is straightforward due to the random 
assignment into different experimental conditions, 
the decision to interact with the messaging prompt 
in identifying savings goals is not a random one, 
and this makes it challenging to establish the 
impact of the interactive messaging prompt on R2S 
participants. To account for potential differences 
between filers who interact with the prompts and 
those who do not, we employed a two-stage least 
squares model to estimate the likelihood of a 
filer interacting with the prompts as a function of 
both the assignment to a particular experimental 
condition and an array of control variables. We used 
the estimates from the first stage, which accounted 
for the differences in filers’ propensities to interact 
with the prompts, to provide an unbiased estimate 
of the impact that interacting with the prompts had 
on tax-time savings behaviors.
10. These percentages do not include students, 
retirees, or homemakers.
11. This does not count any additional time required 
to input a new account number. If repeat TTFE 
filers had deposited to checking in a prior year, 
their account information may have been saved 
for use in subsequent years. In this case, had they 
opted for a checking account deposit, that field 
would have been prepopulated with their account 
number. Encouraging them into a savings account 
deposit would then require additional time to fill 
in the new account information.
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